by
Michael Waldholz Forbes Contributor
On Monday,
Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, and
Elan Pharmaceuticals announced that the
Alzheimer’s drug they were developing together had yielded such a bad result in a clinical trial that they were stopping all further work on it – dashing hopes for the 5 million Americans suffering from Alzheimer’s and becoming the
latest piece of evidence of the
drug industry’s strange gambling problem.
Wall Street expectations weren’t high, with only 23% of investors expecting success after an earlier study also came up neutral, according to a poll by
ISI Group analyst
Mark Schoenebaum.
But some analysts were expecting at least a glimmer of hope, or, in the word’s of
JPMorgan’s Christopher Schott on July 16, “not a black and white outcome.” But the outcome couldn’t have been starker.
There is “no path forward” for the intravenuous (or I.V.) version of
bapineuzumab in mild-to-moderate Alzheimer’s disease, says Pfizer spokeswoman Victoria Davis. (Earlier-stage studies of a newer version that is injected under the skin are continuing.) “Representatives noted that the secondary endpoints results were not promising, and there were no positive signals from existing subset analyses thus far,” wrote
Barclay’s analyst C. Anthony Butler in a note to his clients. “We interpret yesterday’s news as a definitive end to
bapineuzumab, and any glimmer of hope is all but extinguished.”
Pfizer does note that “These data, and the subgroup and biomarker analyses underway, will further inform our understanding of this complex disease and advance research in this field.”
What’s really surprising about
bapineuzumab’s failure is that expectations were as high as they were. And what’s shocking is that
Johnson & Johnson spent more than a
$1 billion to invest in
Elan and get
one-quarter of the drug, and that
Pfizer (or, rather,
Wyeth, which
Pfizer bought) and
Elan chose to push the drug into broad clinical trials despite a single, uncomfortable fact, which was previously noted by
Forbes contributors
David Maris and Nate
Sadeghi:
Bapineuzumab failed in earlier studies, and
Wyeth and
Elan decided to plunge forward anyway.
In an earlier, mid-stage study, the drug failed to help patients by a statistically significant margin. The drug didn’t work much at all in patients who carried a
genetic mutation in a gene called
APOE4, which
increases the risk of Alzheimer’s and
makes the disease worse. But it seemed to have a profound effect in patients who lacked the
APOE4 mutation. The problem is that, in a clinical trial that does not meet its main goal, this kind of
subgroup analysis (or, less charitably,
data-dredging) is very likely to be due to chance.
T
his is not Monday morning quarterbacking. Plenty of people said this when the results were released in 2008.
British Alzheimer’s researcher
John Hardy, who came up with much of the basic science behind “bapi,” told
Forbes at the time:
“Maybe, maybe, maybe [it works], but I am not convinced. I’m worried they are just looking at noise.”
Wyeth and
Elan had plenty of options aside from just plunging ahead. They could have waited for
new diagnostic tests to help figure out if the drug was working. They could have done a series of smaller studies to test whether the effects that were being seen were really there. Or, at the very least, they could have conducted
late-stage studies only in patients who did not have the harmful
APOE4 mutation. (Regulators could have been involved in the decision to test the drug on everybody; that doesn’t make the decision smarter.)
The logic behind going forward probably went something like this:
Alzheimer’s is one of the world’s biggest health problems and any drug that can impact it would be simply huge.
Even if bapi were not that effective, it could have generated
$5 billion in annual sales, easy. It would be crazy not to try, right?
No. The crazy thing was trying. That logic would make perfect sense if it were not for the most difficult fact in drug development: the
drug industry’s failure rate and the
amount of research and
development money spent for each success are
both rising at an exponential rate. The number of new medicines invented per billion dollars spent is halved every 9 years.
Bernstein Research analyst
Jack Scannell has dubbed this
“Eroom’s Law,” not in a
Wall Street research note but in
Nature Reviews Drug Discovery. He’s also warned his clients that it may not be worth trying to fix drug companies with below-average R&D divisions. Even if you make them as good as the average company, R&D will still lose more money than it makes the way things are going.
Whatever a company’s scientists think the likelihood of a project failing is, it’s probably even worse than they think. With the current state of drug research, bapi wasn’t just a
Hail Mary pass, but a Hail Mary pass thrown in gusty gale force wind at a randomly moving target.
What’s worse, these
long-shot bets are getting
more and more expensive.
J&J is taking a
$300 million to $400 million charge in the
third quarter for discontinuing its share of the trials. Even at a scale of hundreds of millions of dollars, the money could be spent differently.
Optimer Pharmaceuticals spent less than $200 million in R&D from the time it went public until the time its first drug,
Dificid, was approved.
But bapi isn’t so bad in one regard. Increasingly companies are willing to make bets of billions of dollars almost completely blind, as clinical trials get larger. This goes for
Eli Lilly’s Effient and
AstraZeneca’s Brilinta, blood thinners that went through huge clinical trials and then failed to garner significant sales. It goes for all the
Factor X blood thinners being developed by
Pfizer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, J&J, and
Bayer whose success will hinge on their bleeding side effects.
Darapladib, a pill to fight
artery inflammation being developed by
GlaxoSmithKline that was one of the reasons for the company’s purchase of
Human Genome Sciences, failed its main goals in an
artery imaging study. But large studies of the compound went forward anyway.
Doing large studies of new medicines is a good thing – it’s the best way to truly establish both safety and efficacy. But that doesn’t mean, at a time when every drug company is struggling to improve its success rates, that we should be doing as many of these studies as possible. Sure, as former
Pfizer research chief
John LaMattina writes, drug development is very hard. This is a business where
more than one in twenty projects fail. But that’s all the reason not to fly blind.
Even drugs that have built a strong track record in earlier trials fail in the late stages of development. There is no reason to push forward with medicines that have little chance for success.
Industry executives are probably thinking back to the success of drugs such as
Plavix and statins like
Lipitor and
Zocor. But the big trials that proved the worth of those drugs came after the medicines were cleared and marketed, and there was a huge amount of data supporting doing big tests to prove the medicines extended lives. Certainly, sometimes doing a study to prove a drug’s benefit is worth it – but you should be able to prove that the odds of success are high in earlier, smaller, cheaper studies. Industry executives should think back to an earlier precedent: the move in
cancer trials pushed by
Genentech more than a decade ago to make mid-stage trials mirror approval studies, with control groups and patients who are randomly assigned either to get the drug or not. The result is fewer drugs progressing into large studies without evidence they work.
There is already a good example in
Alzheimer’s, with a drug a lot like bapi. Some
bapineuzumab skeptics don’t believe that the basic theory behind bapi, that
plaques of a chemical are a
cause of Alzheimer’s, are true.
Amyloid believers think that the drugs just need to be tested
earlier in the process. But it’s hard to know the truth, because in
Alzheimer’s studies there is no way to
even know if all the patients have Alzheimer’s or to
measure whether a drug is removing amyloid plaques from their brains.
Genentech, now part of
Roche, has come up with one elegant test. It’s testing its own antibody against amyloid, developed by its partner
AC Immune, in a study in
Colombia in a population of people who are sadly condemned by a rare genetic mutation to develop
Alzheimer’s. “If with this trial we show that we’re removing or preventing a beta from accumulating in the brain, and the cognitive decline still happens, I’m going to wonder if maybe the amyloid beta hypothesis is true after all,” said
Richard Scheller, executive vice president of research at
Genentech. Some analysts think that
Pfizer and
J&J are keeping an under-the-skin version of bapi in trials like this to show a way to do studies earlier in
Alzheimer’s.
Luckily, the strong trend in the industry is to insist, increasingly, on these kinds of proof of concept studies. It is the long-held research strategy at
Novartis, and is very much what
Elias Zerhouni, the head of research at
Sanofi, has in mind when he talks about his plan to improve long-term success rates. If company executives can stick to this discipline, we’ll all benefit. Like good card players, good drug developers need to
sit out many more hands than they play.